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In an era marked by a global retreat from democracy, this book investigates 'constitutional capture', defined as the systematic and intentional weakening of constitutional checks and balances, to explain how constitutional change facilitates autocratization. Through innovative comparison of Poland, Hungary, Turkey, and Egypt, it details how incumbents subvert judicial independence to consolidate power. This subjugated judiciary then becomes a key facilitator, dismantling executive constraints and suppressing fundamental rights, from LGBTQ+ rights in Poland to collective ownership of national soil in Egypt, illuminating the mutually reinforcing relationship between constitutional manipulation and autocratization.
Dr. Žilvinas Švedkauskas is Assistant Professor at Institute of International Relations and Political Science, Vilnius University, Lithuania.
Introduction 1. What We Fear When We Talk about Constitutionalism 1.1. Constitutional capture - an evolving concept 1.2. Tenets of comparative constitutionalism 1.2.1. Constitutions are created to restrain 1.2.2. Theoretical limits on government 1.2.3. Constitutions without checks and balances? 1.2.4. A flashlight for investigation 2. Methodological Considerations 2.1. Breakthroughs in comparative constitutional change 2.2. External validity: controlled comparisons 2.3. Internal validity: process-tracing 2.4. An integrated approach: "casting the net widely" 3. Empirical Investigations 3.1. Poland: capturing and weaponizing the constitutional court 3.1.1. Packing the court 3.1.2. Sabotaging judicial self-governance 3.1.3. The National Council of the Judiciary 3.1.4. The Supreme Courts & Discipline 3.1.5. Managing backlash from the European Union 3.1.6. Constitutional capture in Poland: domestic calculations, European implications 3.2. Hungary: constitutional order as incumbents' play-doh 3.2.1. Marginalizing the constitutional court 3.2.2. Bending the limits of constitutional interpretation 3.2.3. Autocratic institutional engineering 3.2.4. Attacking non-judicial checks and balances 3.2.5. Constitutional capture in Hungary: creating the "new normal" 3.3. Turkey: from reformed court to unrestrained president 3.3.1. TCC reforms: ideologically charged yet Western-endorsed 3.3.2. All out court-packing 3.3.3. Shielding the state of emergency and its legacy 3.3.4. Removing constraints on the executive 3.3.5. Ambiguous adjudication in individual cases 3.3.6. Constitutional capture in Turkey: setting the stage for a one-man show 3.4. Egypt: establishing al-Sisi's constitutional dominance 3.4.1. Assaulting the judiciary 3.4.2. Overcoming constitutional provisions: the case of Tiran and Sanafir 3.4.3. Court of Administrative Justice - an unexpected challenger 3.4.4. Constitutional amendments: president above the law 3.4.5. Constitutional capture in Egypt: generals in judge robes? 4. Alternatives Conclusions & take-aways
