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This book examines the use and exploitation of intelligence in formulating Britain's strategy for the Arab Revolt during the First World War. It also presents a radical re-examination of the achievements of T.E. Lawrence (Lawrence of Arabia) as an intelligence officer and guerrilla leader.
Polly A. Mohs is an historian and holds a Phd from the University of Cambridge.
Introduction. Legacies of the First World War. Intelligence: Suspended Potential. Progress to the East. The Arab Bureau and British Policy 1. Setting the Scene: British Intelligence and an Arab Insurrection, 1913-15 1.1 British Egypt: Redefining Strategic Security 1.2 Schemes for Subversion: Arab Opportunities and British Ambivalence 1.3 Political Negotiations 1.4 The Foreign Office and the Sykes-Picot Agreement 1.5 The Creation of the Arab Bureau 2. The Outbreak of the Arab Revolt, May-November 1916 2.1 The Sherif of Mecca Launches Uprising 2.2 Complications for British Support 2.3 Debating Control of the Hejaz Campaign 2.4 The Hejaz Uprising: A Precedent for Syria? 3. Arriving at a Doctrine of Guerrilla Warfare, June-October 1916 3.1 The Arab Bureau and Evaluations of the Arab Forces 3.2 Divided Islam and a Military Stalemate 3.3 Crisis at Rabegh: Debate Over an Immobile Brigade 3.4 A 'Corner Turned' for the Arab Revolt, and McMahon 3.5 Lawrence's Mission: Advancing a Strategy of Guerrilla Warfare 4. Intelligence on Trial: The Rabegh Crisis, November 1916-January 1917 4.1 First Alarm at Rabegh: Intelligence Wanted 4.2 The Military Debate Over Reinforcements 4.3 Intelligence and the Strategic Detachment from Medina 4.4 The Shield of Rabegh Collapses: The Turkish Counter-Attack, December 1916 4.5 Intelligence and the Gainsaying of Wingate 5. Reorientation: The Arab Revolt Shifts North, January-April 1917 5.1 Wejh: Filling the Strategy Vacuum 5.2 Regular Support for an Irregular Campaign 5.3 Imint and Turkish Redeployment to the Railway 5.4 Tribal Politics and a Northern Migration 5.5 Sigint and a Vanished Option 6. An Unauthorized Policy Triumph: Intelligence and Aqaba, February-July 1917 6.1 Destination: Medina, Jauf or Aqaba? 6.2 Lawrence's Epiphany on Medina 6.3 Another 'Revolt': The Sykes-Picot Stratagem Stumbles 6.4 Intelligence Assessments: Medina Fades to Syria 6.5 The Best Laid Plans: Political and Military Intelligence on Aqaba 6.6 Aftermath: Intelligence Revelations. Conclusion. Theatre Challenges. Regional Expertise: The Arab Bureau. Lessons: The Lawrence Conundrum